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Introduction by Gospa News Editorial Staff
We relaunch an article published on the Defense One site, very close to the US Department of Defense (Pentagon), which wants to stimulate the American production of missiles as powerful JASSM according to a strategy so dear to the warmongers of the Weapons Lobby.
The JASSM ER (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile–Extended Range aka AGM-158 by Lokeed Martin, the company where worked as advisor the actual Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin) is a stealthy cruise missile intended to be used against high-value or highly-defended targets, such as command-and-control centres, communications hubs or surface-to-air missile batteries. The weapon is qualified for use on the Boeing B-1B supersonic bomber, Northrop Grumman B-21 stealth bomber and Boeing B-52 strategic bomber.
We Don’t Have the Missiles to Stop China. Time For Drone Swarms
by Bryan Clark – originally published by Defense One
All links to Gospa News articles have been added aftermath because the ties with the analyses topics
The war in Ukraine made plain several well-known challenges with precision weapons: they are expensive, rely on complicated supply chains, and take time to build. With Russia’s invasion stretching into its second year and military leaders warning of a looming war with China, analysts, Congress, and defense officials are all arguing for dramatically increased spending on the sophisticated long-range missiles needed for war in the Indo-Pacific.
This is a failure of both analysis and imagination by the world’s largest and most expensive defense establishment.
Decades of funding and policy decisions have led to a “right-sized” defense industry that can produce precision-guided missiles only at a peacetime replacement rate. Efforts to accumulate more PGMs could draw on the excellent recommendations made by recent studies: multi-year purchases, better management of existing stocks, and, yes, increased spending. Yet the fundamental limits remain: rocket fuel, explosives, microelectronics, and skilled technicians are all in short supply. Ramping up production of key missiles, therefore, will take two years or more.
That is time the U.S. military may not have. If Chinese leaders decide military action is necessary to achieve their goals of Indo-Pacific hegemony and a subjugated Taiwan, they are unlikely to wait for the Pentagon to rebuild its weapons stockpiles, field new B-21 bombers, and establish widespread firebases throughout southwest Japan and the Philippines.
An invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, but China’s President Xi may perceive a window opening during which he can change the status quo through a range of operations from blockades or quarantines to cyber attacks, island occupations, and bombardment.
The defense establishment must not pretend that simply opening the money spigots will provide the missiles that will enable the U.S. military to fight the way it wants to against the People’s Liberation Army. Instead, U.S. forces must adopt new concepts and tactics that can win with the weapons and systems they can field this year and next.